



  ationwide, low-performing schools
  are high on the agenda of urban
  school reform leaders. The current
focus reverses the neglect that has plagued
these schools for years. Many of them are
situated in distressed communities that show
the results of years of disinvestment, communi-
ties where a growing concentration of poverty
and its consequences has taken a social and
economic toll. These issues spill over into the
schools. These schools, nevertheless, must teach
all children to high standards of achievement
and mastery, with no excuses.
Despite school reform efforts during the
1980s and 1990s, achievement gaps persist
among low-income, African American, Latino
and Native American students. To close these
gaps, we must honestly examine widely held
values and beliefs about race, ethnicity, social
status, gender and disability, as well as
assumptions about children’s achievement
potential. The central question is will all
children have access to real learning opportu-
nities? Will schools provide all children with
qualified teachers who have high expectations
for their achievement, rigorous programs,
state-of-the-art materials and equipment, and
stimulating enrichment activities? Genuine
accountability for student achievement is
grounded in considerations of access and
equity. If efforts to make low-performing
schools more accountable for student achieve-
ment do not overtly respond to this issue, they
are, at best, ineffective and, at the worst,
inequitable.
In the 1990s, urban schools, and public
education in general, have been undergoing
fundamental review. Broad and accelerating
changes in society are demanding higher
standards of performance than ever before
from the nation’s public schools. In response,
national, state and local leaders are develop-
ing academic standards for what children
should know and be able to do at specific
stages in their education. Almost every state
and class. But problems affecting academic
achievement are just as likely to begin in the
schools. Teachers’ low expectations for student
performance, whether out of misplaced
sympathy, burn-out or frustration, are self-
fulfilling prophecies. Low expectations produce
a correspondingly low level of curriculum that is
taught in an unengaging manner, that results in









We believe that reciprocal
accountability is critical
to creating schools that
are successful in teaching
and learning.
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has adopted or is in the final stages of adopting
standards, and many states are aligning teacher
certification, testing and accountability provisions
to the standards.
Within this context, school districts across the
country have decided to intervene and take an
active role in addressing low school performance.
The interventions are long overdue and welcome,
if done well. The high visibility, take-charge
leadership of some urban superintendents has a
broadly beneficial result of increasing public
confidence in urban public education. It is impor-
tant, however, to explore these interventions to
see if they result in serious improvement in
teaching and learning in schools. It would be
unfortunate if the only results were slightly
improved standardized test scores that provided a
positive “spin” for political leaders.
The Cross City Campaign has focused on equity
and accountability since school reform leaders
from Chicago, Denver, Los Angeles, New York,
Philadelphia, and Seattle founded the organization
in 1993. As school districts across the country
began aggressive interventions in low-performing
schools, we decided to examine these interven-
tions and, at the other end of the spectrum,
initiatives that recognize school success.
This report describes, analyzes and draws lessons
and recommendations from the current interven-
tions, which are primarily district-led. Our examina-
tion also provides an entry point into an inquiry
into reciprocal accountability—strategies and
systems where responsibility is shared among
schools, communities, school districts, and the
state. We believe that reciprocal accountability is
critical to creating schools that are successful in
teaching and learning. Thus, we are interested in
whether, and how, current interventions can lead
in the long run to practices where each stake-
holder in the school system has a strong role to
play and carries out his or her functions interde-
pendently.
The information and analyses in this report have
been drawn from dozens of interviews; reviews of
district documents and the literature on interven-
tions in low-performing schools; and meetings and
discussions among a wide range of participants
from central offices, schools, and communities.
This collaborative approach has helped to shape
the writing of this document.




Educational policymakers discuss accountability by
asking: “Who is or should be accountable to
whom? For what? How should the “what” be
measured and assessed? What happens as a
result?” Our response to these questions is that
genuine systems of educational accountability
promote high levels of achievement for all stu-
dents. We believe that real accountability is school-
based and includes strong roles for parents and
community. Accountability pertains to all aspects
of school life—school autonomy, standards,
curriculum, instruction, professional development,
assessment, schools organized as learning commu-
nities, school budgeting and school size.
Over the past two years, educators and community
leaders have worked with the Cross City Cam-
paign to develop principles that undergird a good,
reciprocal system of accountability. They are
organized under three goals: equity, reciprocity,
and comprehensiveness and coherence.
2 Equity: All children—regardless of race,
ethnicity, gender, economic circumstance,
disability, and English language proficiency—
receive the education they require in order to
achieve to high academic standards.
2 Reciprocity: Principals, teachers, parents,
students, community members, central office
administrators, and the state share roles and
responsibilities for student achievement. Each
institutional level has full authority to carry out
its roles and responsibilities. Parents, students,
and community members are recognized as
essential partners and accorded full respect.
2 Comprehensiveness and Coherence:
Students learn in different ways and bring
different strengths and cultural assets to the
school. Thus, the school community organizes
many resources and strategies to support the
variety of ways in which students learn.
An ideal system of accountability would result in
the achievement of these goals.
INTERVENTIONS IN SIX
CITIES
In 1996, the Cross City Campaign began to look at
intervention initiatives that were underway in six
urban school districts: Chicago, Denver, Los
Angeles, New York, Philadelphia and Seattle. These
interventions have largely been initiated by central
offices, and they have affected widely varying
numbers of schools in each district. Initially, the
Denver initiative took place in only three of the
district’s 115 schools. At the other extreme,
Chicago’s intervention is affecting 140 of the
system’s 583 schools.
Our study focused on three major areas:
What indicators are used to judge school success
or failure? Are data disaggregated to reveal gaps
in student achievement? Are the measures one-
time snapshots or do they represent school trends
over time?
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Chicago’s approach to intervention is organized
along a continuum of corrective actions concen-
trated in three processes: remediation, probation,
and reconstitution. Chicago Public Schools (CPS)
administrators look at standardized test scores
from the Iowa Tests of Basic Skills (ITBS) in elemen-
tary schools and the Tests of Academic Proficiency
(TAP) in high schools to determine when to place
schools on intervention. In addition, the Illinois
State Board of Education administers the Illinois
Goal Assessment Program (IGAP) statewide. The
state identifies schools with declining IGAP scores
on its academic early warning list and provides the
first warning for Chicago schools that they may be
headed for intervention.
Remediation is a relatively nonintrusive, early
intervention process that is triggered when only 15
to 20 percent of a school’s students are performing
at or above national norms on the reading portion
of the ITBS, or when a school is on the state’s
academic early warning list. A team from the CPS’
Office of Accountability visits the school to assess
its needs. Based on the recommendations from the
site visit, the school develops a remediation plan,
which does not require school board approval.
Probation signals that either a school has failed to
correct its deficiencies under remediation, or that a
school’s problems are more severe than
remediation can adequately address. CPS places a
school on probation when fewer than 15 percent
of its students perform at or above national norms
in reading. A probation school must develop a
corrective action plan and receive school board
approval to implement the plan. Staff from the
intervention unit of the Accountability Office
2
3
What processes do school districts employ to
engage the schools, parents and community in
supporting improvement? Are the processes
leading to stronger school-based authority and
responsibility? To reciprocal accountability?
What are the key characteristics of the interven-
tions’ implementation? Do successful schools
share their experiences with less successful
schools? Are the interventions isolated or part of a
larger, systemwide reform initiative?  What funds
and assistance are provided?
Ultimately, we wanted to know whether the
interventions are quick political fixes or serious
commitments to education, whether the actions
being taken are likely to result in sustained and
sustainable school improvement and whether they
advance the cause of reciprocal accountability so
that continuous school improvement becomes the
norm.
     Chicago
Chicago’s current effort to reform its schools began
with the passage of the 1988 Chicago School
Reform Act.  In 1995 an amendment gave
Chicago’s mayor the authority to appoint a new
scaled-down Chicago School Reform Board of
Trustees and a central office team headed up by a
chief executive officer (CEO), Paul G. Vallas.  In that
year the Board of Trustees and the CEO created a
new Office of Accountability and gave it the
mandate to identify and support desired educa-
tional outcomes and standards of performance for
the Chicago Public School System of 567 schools
and 421,000 students.
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monitor plan implementation. A “probation
management team” also monitors school progress
and provides support. The team consists of a
probation manager, an external partner, a business
manager, a representative from the regional
education office, a Local School Council (LSC)
member and the school’s principal.
Reconstitution is the most severe intervention and
applies to schools that, after a maximum of one
year on probation, have failed to make sufficient
progress in correcting educational deficiencies. In
reconstituted schools the principal may be re-
placed, all staff must resign but may reapply to the
school and undergo an interview and new LSC
elections may be ordered.
Building on a base of Chicago schools working in
partnership with an extensive group of external
agencies since the 1988 reform, the CPS adminis-
tration assembled a network of  “external part-
ners” to provide technical assistance and support
to schools on remediation or probation.  The
External Partner program costs $9 million annually.
Approximately 10 area colleges, universities and
educational organizations, with purported capabili-
ties to raise student performance and to customize
their assistance to meet the individual needs of
schools, are providing these services.
During the 1996-97 school year, CPS placed 109
schools (71 elementary and 38 high schools) on
probation. At the end of the 1996-97 school year,
25 schools were eligible to be removed from this
status because they had raised their test scores to
at least the 20 percent level. Despite the gains,
CPS removed only one high school and eight
elementary schools from probation. The district
elected to continue oversight and support for one
more year to solidify the increases. In the 1997-98
school year, one more high school and 14 elemen-
tary schools were placed on probation, a net gain
of six schools. Additionally, seven of the probation
high schools were reconstituted.
In late 1997, the central administration developed
an additional process for identifying schools that
may need intervention. The new process serves as
an early warning to schools that are beginning to
experience decline. This “Systemwide Accountabil-
ity Plan” provides a framework for evaluating
schools that are experiencing declines in test scores
and for providing rewards to schools that are
improving academic achievement. Progress is still
measured by the ITBS and TAP tests. Schools are
grouped into three levels: Level A schools show
either an increase, no change, or a decline of less
than two percentage points; Level B schools show
a one-year decline of more than two percentage
points; and Level C schools show a two-year
decline of more than three percentage points.
The central administration intends to reward Level
A schools for targeted completion of set goals.
Level B schools are required to develop a self-
evaluative plan to increase scores. Level C schools
are provided assistance in developing their school
improvement plans, workshops on standardized
tests, and a business manager or intern to allow
the principal to focus on instruction.  The proba-
tion and remediation processes will continue for
the most seriously underperforming schools and
for those schools on the state’s academic early
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warning list. Under the new system, schools that
continue to decline could be downgraded to a
lower level, placed on probation or reconstituted.
         Denver
In early 1997, the Denver school board authorized
Superintendent Irv Moscowitz (appointed in 1994)
to undertake the radical procedure of reconstitut-
ing a selected number of consistently poorly
performing elementary schools. The adoption of
the School Redesign and Remediation Plan
signaled the intent of the Denver Public Schools
(DPS ) to take action on failing schools and put a
spotlight on accountability in the 115-school,
68,000 student district.
DPS is currently encountering challenges similar to
those that other urban school districts face,
including fiscal constraints (exacerbated by a
constitutional limit on spending), a poverty-
impacted student population, and changing
student demographics. After years of decline, DPS
enrollment has grown by several thousand
students over the past four years. Most of the
enrollment growth comes from low-income areas,
and many of the new students are Mexican
immigrants.
DPS’ School Redesign and Remediation Plan
contains three levels of intervention: remediation,
partial redesign, and full redesign. A school on
remediation is given a specified amount of time to
reorganize its methodologies and instructional
atmosphere. Partial redesign and full redesign are
aimed at changing the organizational and instruc-
tional environment of the school. During partial
redesign, a portion of teaching and other school
staff positions are posted as vacant. The principal
and classified staff may also be reassigned.
Redesign causes all teaching and other school staff
positions to be vacated, and the principal is
reassigned. At both partial redesign and redesign
schools, current teachers may apply for positions
for which they are qualified.
Throughout the spring of 1997, a team of central
office administrators, principals, teachers, and
representatives from the Denver Classroom
Teachers Association worked together to identify
schools that demonstrated a pattern of low
achievement. They also conducted site reviews to
determine how organization and school culture
contributed to the schools’ poor performance. The
team initially looked blindly (the names of the
schools were kept anonymous) at the 10 elemen-
tary schools in the district with the lowest aggre-
gated test scores over the preceding five years.
Results were examined in particular for the
number of students in each school who scored
below the 25th percentile on the reading portion of
the ITBS. The team also looked at results from the
district’s assessment showing achievement levels in
language and math, and at alternative school-level
assessments.
The team identified four elementary schools as
“candidates for redesign” and paid site visits to all
four. In May 1997, the team identified two schools
for full redesign. A third school was placed on
remediation.  The team did not recommend any
formal intervention for the fourth school because
it determined that the existing staff had a work-
able strategy to address the identified problems.
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The School Redesign and Remediation Plan
outlines additional resources that the district may
offer the two schools that are undergoing rede-
sign: 1) $100,000 was allocated in the budget,
$50,000 for each of the two redesign schools. The
uses of these funds are mutually agreed to by the
school and the Department of Elementary Educa-
tion. 2) Extra help also was provided. Two literacy
specialists (out of 7.5 available to all 81 elementary
schools) were assigned as a priority to the redesign
schools on a part-time basis. One of the schools,
with a large bilingual population, also received a
bilingual specialist. In addition, each school has a
master teacher (a support that is available to other
schools that are not redesign schools as well and
that is acquired by staff reallocation), without
other classroom assignments, who works full-time
on instructional issues.
    Los Angeles
In 1997, the Los Angeles Unified School District
(LAUSD) began a transition as Ruben Zacarias, a
31 year veteran of the school system and deputy
superintendent since 1992, was promoted to
superintendent. In recent years, LAUSD has been
moving toward systemic reform in response to
increasing pressure from parents, citizens, the
business community, voucher proponents, and
those in favor of breaking up the nation’s second
largest district of 636 schools and 680,000
students into smaller districts.
In one of the earliest policy initiatives of his
administration, Superintendent Zacarias an-
nounced that the district would intervene in the
100 lowest performing schools during the 1997-
1998 school year. Standardized test scores from
the spring 1996 California Test of Basic Skills
(CTBS) were the basis for school identification.
Once identified, each school was invited to bring a
team to meet with the superintendent to discuss
its data and plans, the superintendent’s goals, and
help that would be available. Schools brought
teams that might include the principal, a union
representative, teachers and parents. Superinten-
dent Zacarias conducted these meetings during his
first five months in office. Each school was to
develop an improvement plan with improved
results expected by June 1998.
The central office provided two kinds of support
to the 100 schools: 1) Some $9 million—roughly
$90,000 per school—was allocated to assist
schools with their improvement plans; and 2)
Veteran teachers could apply for and be desig-
nated as master teachers to assist the large
number of new teachers at these schools. As a
result, the number of master teachers at the 100
schools doubled.
New York
Currently, New York City schools are undergoing
intervention from two levels of the school system.
Schools Under Registration Review (SURR), a state-
mandated program initiated in 1989, is the
primary vehicle for intervening in low-performing
schools. In addition, in 1996, New York City’s
Chancellor, Rudolph F. Crew (appointed in 1995)
created a special subdistrict called the Chancellor’s
District to directly intervene in, and restructure,
low-performing schools identified under the state
program. During the 1996-1997 school year, there
were 92 city schools identified as SURR within
the nation’s largest district of 1,136 schools (in
1997-1998) and over one million students.
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New York state regulations stipulate that every
public school in the state must be registered by the
state Board of Regents. No school district may
operate a public school whose registration has
been revoked. The SURR process is designed to
correct situations that impede quality education
and to measurably improve student performance.
The New York State Education Department (SED)
identifies low-performing schools, conducts
registration review visits, offers technical assistance
and support services to these schools, and moni-
tors school progress.
Each year the state gives a series of standardized
tests covering certain subject areas for students in
specified grades. At least 90 percent of a school’s
students who take the state tests are expected to
score at or above the statewide performance
benchmarks. The State Education Department
(SED) analyzes the test scores for each school to
identify schools that are farthest from meeting
these minimum standards. Those schools that
most need improvement are identified as SURR.
The department also looks at a school’s dropout
rate, which should not exceed five percent.
In addition, any school identified as being a “poor
learning environment” may be required to un-
dergo registration review.  SED can identify a
school as a “poor learning environment” if the
school fails to meet state performance criteria:  if it
is the subject of persistent parent complaints; or if
it has conditions that threaten the health, safety or
educational welfare of its students.  Such condi-
tions may include, but are not limited to, high
rates of student absenteeism, excessive suspension
rates, inordinate levels of violence, and violations
of building health and safety standards.
Once the school has been identified, the local
school district has an appeal option within the
SURR process. The SURR process also includes a
warning from the state that the school may lose its
registration, and it requires public notification of
the school’s status. The public notification must
include both a direct communication to parents
and disclosure at the next public school board
meeting. The warning includes a specific summary
of the educational progress that the school must
demonstrate before it may be considered “no
longer at risk.”  The registration review visit takes
place after a school is identified. The state sends in
a team made up of administrators, teachers, union
representatives, education specialists, parents, and
State Education Department staff. The review team
visits the school for four days and provides a report
to the school and the district that includes recom-
mendations for improvement. The school and
school district must each produce an improvement
plan based on the review team’s findings. The
state then monitors the implementation of the two
plans. The SURR school has three full academic
years to demonstrate acceptably improved student
results.
In October 1995, the state’s commissioner of
education informed the New York City Board of
Education that 16 city schools identified as SURR
for nearly a decade would be placed under
Corrective Action for failure to demonstrate
progress. Corrective Action is a SURR category that
signals a school is in danger of registration
revocation if student performance does not
significantly improve within a given time frame.
Each Corrective Action school is required to
undergo “redesign,” a process that—with full
support of the union—closes the school and
reopens it as a new school. In response, in early
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1996, Chancellor Rudolph F. Crew created a
special structure, the Chancellor’s District, to carry
out the city’s direct intervention in Corrective
Action schools that failed to demonstrate the
capacity (or the willingness) to redesign. In fiscal
years 1997 and 1998, the Crew administration
spent more than $7 million in special allocations
for the Chancellor’s District.
The support for Chancellor’s District schools
includes: recruitment and professional support of
qualified staff, reallocation of resources to
strengthen improvement efforts, modification of
instructional programs, identification and promo-
tion of successful instruction models, and access
for parents to meaningful involvement and
participation in the redesign of the school.
Each school undergoing redesign must focus on
student literacy and establish a school-based
planning team to organize, develop, and carry out
the redesign plan. The school is supported by on-
site technical assistance in both process (team-
building, school assessment) and content (instruc-
tional strategies, curriculum). A school remains
assigned to the Chancellor’s District until there is
sufficient evidence to demonstrate it is able to
make adequate progress toward meeting student
performance targets.
             Philadelphia
An accountability framework known as the
Professional Responsibility System (PRS) is a
cornerstone of the Philadelphia School District’s
comprehensive Children Achieving reform plan.
David W. Hornbeck, superintendent, introduced
the plan within six months of his appointment in
1994.  Standards and a new assessment instru-
ment are elements of this system. Other features
include a teacher/administrator performance index,
individual school performance targets, and rewards
and sanctions based on school performance in the
district of 261 schools and 213,000 students.
PRS is framed around the principle of continuous
improvement. A baseline performance level is
established in key areas for each school in the
district, and each school’s growth is measured
against its own baseline. The indicators that are
factored into the performance index are: Stanford-
9/APRENDA test scores; student success at the
next level (the proportion of elementary students
from a given school who are promoted on time as
they move through middle school; and the
proportion of middle school students who gradu-
ate from high school four years later); student
attendance; staff attendance; promotion rates (first
through eighth grades); and persistence rates
(ninth grade to high school graduation). The
composite score from these indicators permits the
evaluation of a school’s current status, the setting
of performance targets, and the measurement of
school progress on key student outcomes.
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All schools are expected to reach the standard of
95 percent of students performing at what the
central office has defined as a “proficiency” level
within one student generation, or 12 years. While
taking into account that schools are starting from
different places, the system nevertheless includes
the academic progress of low-performing students
as well as higher-achieving students as part of the
performance target for each school.
Performance is calculated on a two-year account-
ability cycle. Schools received their initial baseline
in the spring of 1996. At the end of the first
accountability cycle, which ended with 1998
testing, schools were categorized based on
performance—and received rewards, support, or
penalties accordingly.
In September 1997, the central administration
decided to take an interim look at school perfor-
mance based on single-year index scores from the
1996-1997 school year. The district reported
substantial progress with increases in every
component of the performance index. The index
scores also indicated that the performance of 13
schools had declined. 10-member school support
teams visited the identified schools, spending three
days at each site. The teams were composed of
principals, teachers, support staff, parents, and
education specialists, as well as district-level
representatives who served as team leaders. Prior
to the visits, the teams received two days of
training to guide the performance review.
After the site visits were concluded, the teams
developed their recommendations with milestones
in a written report that was circulated to staff and
parents of students at the visited schools. The
teams also debriefed with the schools’ principals,
faculty, and parents to discuss their findings. The
schools were given an opportunity to respond to
the findings and prepare school commentaries. A
review panel consisting of central administration
cabinet members and representatives from the
teachers’ and principals’ unions, business commu-
nity, Home School Association, and higher educa-
tion convened and reviewed the team reports and
the school commentaries. The review panel’s
decision was the determining factor in the imple-
mentation of the support teams’ recommenda-
tions and progress milestones. The first progress
report deadline was January 1998, less than four
months after school identification.
This process provided no new school-based funds.
Rather, the expectations were that the strategies
employed by the identified schools would involve
better use of current resources at the central
office, cluster, and school levels.
Seattle
Seattle’s 97 public schools serve 47,000 students
from very diverse backgrounds. For the past 20
years, available data have made clear that there is
a problem that Seattle has labeled “disproportion-
ality.” Many minority students, particularly African
American students, fall farther and farther behind,
until they are among the lowest performers in
numbers disproportionate to their total population
within the district. In fact, over one-fourth of them
do not graduate at all. Two decades of rhetoric,
failed programs, worry, and attention have not
solved this problem.
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Superintendent John Stanford was hired by the
board in the summer of 1995 with a mandate to
improve student achievement. Earlier in the spring
of 1995, the school board adopted a policy for
annual review of each school, with attention to
schools not meeting specific criteria. A team of
principals, teachers, and central office staff
launched the School Effectiveness Initiative to
implement the policy. The process had two goals:
1) to identify schools that need support and
intervention; and 2) to identify effective practices
worthy of recognition and replication.
In 1996, the school board set academic achieve-
ment targets on the ITBS for all schools. The
minimum goal is to reduce the total numbers of
students scoring in the two lowest quartiles by 10
percent and 15 percent respectively, and to
increase the total number scoring in the two
highest quartiles by 5 percent each year. Each
school receives its test score information in the fall
and then develops an educational plan to achieve
the target test outcomes for the following spring.
The 1997-98 contract with the teachers’ union
includes two student-free days at the beginning of
the school year to allow teachers time to review
test data and work on the educational plan.
Under the School Effectiveness Initiative, school
profiles are created for each school using a wide
variety of longitudinal measures. The indicators
include scores from the ITBS; direct writing
assessments; curriculum-based assessments;
attendance/truancy rates; dropout rates; gradua-
tion rates; climate and satisfaction surveys (from
students, staff, and parents); and number of
suspensions, expulsions, and weapons incidents.
These data are assembled as a “school effectiveness
profile” for each school, comparing the school to
itself over three years and to overall district stan-
dards and averages. The academic achievement
data, with socioeconomic indicators factored in,
are given more weight than other data.
Two committees, a five-person screening team and
a 12-person review panel—both composed of
principals, teachers, central office administrators,
and union representatives—review the data for
each school. They look for schools whose data
show either downward trends or exemplary
progress when compared against themselves. They
initially reviewed 29 schools whose scores were
troubling, as well as 30 schools whose data were
positive. The principals of the 29 schools were
notified and asked to come before the review
team with a school team to discuss their data.
The interview gave the schools an opportunity to
present additional information and to disagree
with or interpret the data. Following these inter-
views, the screening team reviewed the data
again. This process narrowed the list from 29
to nine schools that were identified as Focus
Schools. The identity of the nine schools was
kept confidential.
Focus Schools receive increasingly intensive
intervention and support if they do not show
improvement over a three-year period, which is the
maximum length of time a school is assigned
Focus School status. Progress is monitored each
year by the screening team through the data
prepared for the annual school profile, and the
superintendent’s evaluation of the principals
involved. If improvement is not evident at the end
of each of the three years, the intervention
becomes more prescriptive.
The 1995-1996 school year was the first year of
implementation. Three main supports were
provided to the Focus Schools: 1) The central office
allocated a total of $89,000, approximately $9,000
per school, to spend on activities such as staff
development and time for staff to create an
improvement plan; 2) The schools were given
preference for sending teachers to professional
development opportunities that were available
through grants and special funds; and 3) A core
group from central office was assigned to visit
each school on a regular basis. These intervention
teams, as they were called, were composed of two
or three central office administrators, drawn
mostly from the Department of Curriculum and
Instruction, and sometimes included retired
principals and union representatives. The Focus
Schools had considerable discretion in developing
their improvement plan.
Twelve schools were added to the Focus Schools
List in the 1996-1997 school year. Based on what
worked well and poorly in year one, the process
was modified in year two. Schools were pushed to
focus specifically on one area of improvement. If
they were unable to determine their own focus,
the Department of Curriculum and Instruction
directed them to one of the reform models being
implemented in the district. A clear chain of
responsibility was instituted to oversee school help,
though on-site intervention teams were discontin-
ued. Many of the principals were moved to other
schools.  The $9,000 in discretionary money was
to be directly linked to the school’s improvement
plan. By the end of year two, some of the first year
schools had made sufficient progress to move to a
second level of intervention called the “M and M”
group, or those schools that receive monitoring
and money to ensure that gains are maintained. In
the third year (1997-1998), six new schools
became Focus Schools, and five schools were
identified as requiring more careful monitoring
because of concern regarding their progress.
INTERVENTION ISSUES AND
ANALYSIS
Our examination of district and state interventions
surfaced issues that were common across cities. In
light of these issues, we posed the question to
ourselves: “What would an intervention in a low-
performing school look like if it were meeting a
standard of excellence?” Thus, to undergird our
assessment of the initiatives, we developed a set of
intervention standards that address indicators,
process, and implementation. We then assessed
the interventions in light of these standards.
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The focus on standardized testing is also
taking precedence over monitoring and
tracking individual student performance.
Although each of our cities has recently adopted
and begun to implement content standards
describing what students should know and be able
to do, we found less emphasis on assessing the
learning of individual students.
Disaggregated data are not being provided
to schools to facilitate their responses to
achievement gaps associated with race,
ethnicity, gender, disability, English lan-
guage proficiency, and socioeconomic level.
Data should drive decisions at the school level, but
we found little evidence of data being used to
tailor solutions aimed at improving instruction for
particular students or groups of students.
Process
The standard: The intervention process is fair,
mutually respectful, and public. It engages all
stakeholders—principals, teachers, parents,
students, community members, unions, site
councils, and central office and state administra-
tors.
Key issue:  A low priority is placed on shaping
relationships among stakeholders and on
building ownership to improve student
achievement at the school level.
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Indicators
The standard: Multiple indicators from multiple
sources, reviewed over time, measure the success
of teaching and learning and allow schools to
evaluate their own performance and compare their
performance with peer schools, the district as a
whole, and schools in similar districts.
Key issue:  There is an over-reliance on
standardized test scores for measuring school
and student performance.
Standardized test scores are carrying inordi-
nate weight.
Rather than using a broader set of indicators of
school performance over time, central administra-
tions use standardized testing almost exclusively to
identify low-performing schools and to measure
school improvement. Increasingly, “school suc-
cess” is being equated with higher test scores.
The heavy emphasis by central administra-
tions on increasing standardized test scores
is working at cross-purposes with the
systemwide goal of teaching all children to
high standards.
High-stakes standardized testing is diverting
attention away from the importance of good
instructional practice. Schools that spend months
concentrating on test preparation do not have
time to implement high standards.
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The interventions have not only been “top-
down,” they have been “inside.”
Generally, parents, community members, and
school site councils have been on the sidelines of
school change. Unions have slowly begun to
participate as calls for school-level accountability
have increased. Clear intervention roles have not
been defined, nor have the requisite resources
been made available for meaningful engagement.
New patterns of participation among all stake-
holders, focused on school quality, must emerge
if there is going to be positive and sustained
school change.
Implementation
The standard: The intervention is undertaken in a
manner that builds capacity at the local school
level to strengthen teaching and learning and
results in significant improvement in achievement
for all students.
Key issue:  Major investment is needed to
build local school capacity to improve teach-
ing and learning.
Although additional sums are being allo-
cated, the investment in professional




Central administrations are exercising
energetic and determined leadership to
intervene in low-performing schools but are
alienating school-level personnel with their
tactics.
Driven by a strong commitment to improve
student achievement and by mounting public
intolerance of failing schools, central office leaders
are using high visibility tactics in high stakes
interventions. Their bold, decisive actions, which
heavily involve the media, successfully communi-
cate a sense of urgency and, thus, gain a measure
of public support. These same actions, however,
also are breeding misunderstanding, fear, cynicism,
and mistrust among the school constituencies who
must be involved in the work to make significant
student achievement improvements.
Central administrations are stifling school-
initiated accountability.
On the one hand, school districts and state
agencies must set clear policies, develop sufficient
structure, provide appropriate resources and
oversight, and implement real consequences for
low-performing schools that do not improve
within prescribed time frames. It is equally impor-
tant, however, to recognize that to achieve
genuine accountability, school districts and state
agencies must increase or preserve autonomy and
enhance flexibility at the school level (including
both budgets and programs) so that schools can
actively engage in their own achievement of
districtwide standards.
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In general, the interventions have brought three
sources of support to schools: new central office
structures, extra funds, and external help. The
latter two elements, however, have varied tremen-
dously. School districts and state agencies are
reluctant to publicly address the scope and cost of
the support that must be provided to help schools
improve.  Current actions follow years of frag-
mented activity or inattention to improving
teachers’ and principals’ knowledge and skills.
We found little evidence that the interven-
tions were organized around a research base
of successful instructional practices or
around connections to successful models of
interventions in low-performing schools.
Moreover, the interventions varied in terms of
whether they were implemented as a strategy
encompassed in a comprehensive systemwide
effort or as an isolated, nonsystemic initiative.
At the end of “round one” of school inter-
ventions, political considerations and
timelines are taking precedence over
educational requirements.
There is considerable distance between the stated
goals of the interventions and the reality of the




There are essential roles that school districts can
and must play to ensure school-level success. Only
top leadership in the school district can send a
systemwide message on equity—that low perfor-
mance will no longer be tolerated in any school or
with any group of students. Only central office
leaders can adopt districtwide standards and hold
all schools accountable for meeting these stan-
dards. The district negotiates and agrees to
contracts with all employees agreements that are
critical for planning and implementing effective
interventions and school improvement strategies.
Only school districts can reconstitute a school,
removing or replacing all staff—an action that is
sometimes necessary to break a culture of failure
at a school.
It is school districts and school boards that must
ensure that all schools have the support and the
authority they need to transform practice. Only the
school board can review, revise, or eliminate
district policies that contribute to poor school
performance—policies governing principal,
teacher, and student assignments; teacher hiring;
budget authority; and data collection and dissemi-
nation. The district must make certain that every
school has adequate funding and that resources
are distributed equitably. The school district can
most effectively send a consistent message to the
public about the importance of all students
achieving to high standards. And the superinten-
dent can lead the effort to build a broad base of
public support for the investment necessary to
improve low-performing schools.
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If, however, one were designing an ideal system of
intervening in low-performing schools—a system
that had as its goal significant improvement in
teaching and learning—central office interventions
would not be the starting point. They would be an
important last resort, after careful investment in
other approaches. School districts can catalyze
action, but they cannot improve educational
practice. That work must happen at the school,
with active parent and community participation.
The very nature of a large organization works
against the carefully tailored, school-based work
that serious educational change requires. By and
large, central administrations as primary actors
have tended to use generalized and one-size-fits-
all reform programs or approaches rather than a
particular approach that is designed for a specific
school and that draws on its strengths. While
schools may have had years of low performance,
most interventions expect schools to make major
gains in very short periods of time. We agree that
the work is urgent—students’ futures are at stake.
But if serious educational change is desired, it will
not occur in one school year. The initiatives have
resulted in some test score gains, but that is not
the same as improved schools.
Recommendations
When examined against standards for an effective
intervention aimed at better teaching and learning,
these initiatives fall far short. We offer the follow-
ing recommendations for improving district-led
interventions.
Indicators
Develop multiple indicators of school perfor-
mance and review them over time.
Any high stakes intervention should be based on a
series of indicators of school and student perfor-
mance, the trends of which are reviewed over
time. These indicators should include—but not be
limited to—scores on standardized tests that have
been aligned to a district’s standards; other
methods of assessing student performance (direct
teacher observation, teacher-designed tests,
student portfolios, exhibits, and so on); student
attendance; student suspension/expulsion rates;
dropout and mobility rates; course offerings;
numbers of students taking college preparation
courses; success at the next level; graduation rates;
teacher attendance; level of teacher education and
percentage of teachers who are teaching in their
areas of certification; and measures of parental
engagement.
Disaggregate data for every school by race,
ethnicity, gender, primary language, socioeco-
nomic status, and disabilities.
In order to thoughtfully judge school and student
performance, data needs to be differentiated so
that the parts, as well as the whole, are visible.
Various groups of students at a school may be
performing very differently. In fact, increasing a
school’s average test scores may mask the failure
rates among some students.
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Use disaggregated data to close the perfor-
mance gap among students.
Improving performance in low-performing schools
must include all students, especially those scoring
in the lowest quartiles on standardized tests and
doing least well on other measures. Improving
performance for all students will require close
attention to disaggregated data. Tailor specific
strategies for different students to ensure their
progress.
Make the use of data the norm for school
improvement planning and decision-making.
Parents, site councils, community leaders, teachers,
and principals should be sophisticated data users.
This will allow them to make wise judgments
about school progress and share in planning and
implementing strategies for improvement. Achiev-
ing this, however, will require that data be orga-
nized and user-friendly. Central administrators,
principals and teachers, site council members,
parents, and community leaders need to work
together to identify which data are needed, how
they will be prepared, and when they will be made
available to schools. Data review and reflection
should be built into the regular school schedule,
and there also must be time allowed for public
discussion of the data. Then, the information that
is acquired through data can be incorporated into
the school improvement plan.
Work with schools to develop multiple,
alternative methods of assessing student
progress; work to make those assessment
methods educationally credible and publicly
understood and accepted.
1
Standardized, norm-referenced test scores carry
enormous political weight. Although they were
designed for narrow purposes and do not measure
student progress over time, they are, in fact,
widely used for many purposes, including high
stakes decision-making. At the same time, educa-
tors and community leaders are developing new
educational methods of assessing student work
that are not standardized. Student portfolios and
public demonstrations of student mastery are only
two of many examples. These approaches need to
be fully developed and shared across sites. Once
these measures have become sound and reliable,
education and community leaders will need to
create and implement careful strategies to en-
hance these assessments’ political and educational
acceptance.
Processes
Help schools develop a process for regular
self-diagnosis.
In order to help schools take responsibility for their
own improvement—before a district intervenes—
schools, districts, and states should work together
to develop and implement a regular process for
school self-study and planning. When this kind of
rigorous self-diagnosis exposes problems and
issues, schools and the district should design and





Notify and interview schools identified for
intervention before there is a public an-
nouncement.
In some cities, a punitive climate was created
because school staff, students, and parents first
learned about the impending intervention when
they saw their school named in the newspaper.
This is not a good way to begin the partnership
that will be required if schools are to improve.
Before schools are identified for intervention, they
should be notified and given a chance to discuss
the data on their performance. Before the public is
notified, schools should have time to inform
teachers and parents and begin to enlist them in
an improvement process.
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a line between directives and encouragement,
between tough love and support, between no
excuses and respect, and between central office
dictates and local diagnosis and action.
Enlist school site councils, parents, and
community members as major allies in the
intervention and improvement process.
Most of the interventions to date have been
“insider” operations, with little attention to, or
support for, the critical role that parents, site
councils, and other members of the school
community can and should play. Parent and
community participation occurs most effectively at
the school level, but the central administration has
an important role to fulfill in encouraging and
promoting this participation. Make data publicly
available, create improvement plans that involve
strong roles for these leaders, and enlist the
community resources to which they have access.
Implementation
Adopt a timeline for improvement that
communicates both urgency and the time
needed to make substantial educational
improvements.
Some of the interventions have signaled their
superficiality by demanding major changes in a
few months. But serious school change takes time.
If interventions are comprehensive and use a
coherent instructional improvement framework,
they will, by necessity, require more than one year
to implement. Improvements should be measur-
able every year, but a serious and sustainable turn-
around of a low-performing school is a multi-
year effort.
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Engage principals and teachers.
In the relatively small number of reconstituted
schools, teachers and principals are removed from
their jobs and have to reapply if they wish to return
to that school. In most low-performing schools
involved in interventions, however, the same
principal and teachers will remain at the school and
will be the primary leaders of the improvement.
School district administrators, therefore, must walk
5xix
cross-school exchange and support. Such a
culture is needed in order to tap the peer-to-peer
mentoring that could provide one of the most
productive sources of support.
Revise or eliminate school district policies that
contribute to low performance.
Just as they demand improvements at the school
level, school districts have important work to do to
put their own houses in order. Working with
principals, site councils, teachers, and parents, they
must make a commitment to identify and then
revise (or eliminate) their own policies and prac-
tices that stymie school improvement. Policies that
might need change include, but are not limited to,
teacher hiring and assignment, principal tenure,




We propose moving beyond the current interven-
tions to a system of reciprocal accountability—a
school-centered approach focused on success for
all students. An equitable, comprehensive, and
reciprocal system of accountability requires all
participants to take active roles, in contrast to
having a system imposed by the central office or
the state. It strives for intrinsic accountability in
which members of the school community—
teachers, principals, site council members, parents,
and students—are the primary designers, with
strong support from the central office and the
state. Reciprocal accountability means that
everyone accepts responsibility for results.




Make a major investment in supporting
the professional growth of teachers and
principals.
Teaching all children to high standards and
expecting high levels of achievement for all
students requires excellent teaching by all teachers.
Although teaching transformation should be
viewed as the single most important intervention in
improving low-performing schools, it has not been
a focus. The work required to transform teaching
should be school-based and employ multiple
strategies within and across schools. To be done
well, transforming teaching practices requires both
a significant infusion of new funds and a redeploy-
ment of current funds.
Provide high-quality external help that has a
“track record” of improving low-performing
schools.
Low-performing schools need help to change what
is often a culture of failure. That help should be
substantive, sustained, and of proven quality. It can
be provided by an educational organization, a
higher education institution, a successful school, or
a community group—whoever the entities are,
they should be able to demonstrate their successful
results in other, similar circumstances. School
communities should play a leading role in design-
ing the help needed and in choosing among
potential support providers.
Engage successful schools as mentors for their
low-performing peers.
Schools that have succeeded in educating students
well in urban communities are essential sources of
help to their less successful peers. In most urban
school districts, however, there is no culture of
xx
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learn to high standards? Should schools be
held accountable if the state and district have
failed to invest in implementing standards
well?
 5 Who initiates standards in a system of
reciprocal accountability? The school? The
district? The state? How do we ensure that
parents and community members are active
participants in discussions of standards and
the resources needed to implement them?
 6 Can we avoid the “blame syndrome” for
parents and communities and move to
solutions that include support, respectful
partnerships, and fair accountability?
 7 Are we willing to provide the needed time,
resources, and rigor to make substantive
improvement in schools and school districts?
How long is long enough?
 8 What constitutes meaningful progress? For
parents? Schools? Districts? How can pro-
gress over time be demonstrated? What
methods should be devised to compare
progress across schools when alternative
forms of assessment are used?
 9 How should political pressures for prompt
action be honored? How can a school district
or a school honestly report low performance
and limited progress in a politically charged
environment?
 10  If schools need autonomy and authority to
 be accountable, what steps should precede
 district-led interventions? Can interventions
 be designed to increase autonomy?
Reciprocal accountability assumes high expecta-
tions, assessment, continuous improvement, and
mutually supportive relationships among all those
who play a role in education, both inside and
outside the system. In a reciprocal system, all
participants actively work to ensure that all
students experience success in school. Authority
and responsibility are clearly located at the school,
with strong support provided by the school district
and the state.
Some Tough Questions
Implicit in both our critique and the approach we
advocate are many unanswered questions—
questions that represent discussions to be had and
work to be done. A few of them follow.
 1 What is needed at all levels to close the
systemwide achievement gap?
 2 In a system of reciprocal accountability, what
steps are necessary to ensure that issues of
equity do not get separated from issues of
excellence?
 3 To what extent should teachers and principals
be held accountable for student perfor-
mance? What supports and consequences are
appropriate for teachers whose classes are
consistently low-performing? What role can
unions play in ensuring that teachers who
should no longer be teaching find other jobs?
 4 In what ways can we hold central office and
state administrators accountable for student
performance? Is it possible to raise the
standards of achievement for students with-
out financial investment in opportunities to
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Still, practices are in place that reflect some
elements of the system we advocate. Building
these practices into an equitable, comprehensive,
and reciprocal system of accountability requires
thoughtful leaders who can integrate the elements
into a strong whole. When we hold urban schools
accountable for teaching all students to high
standards, it is not just an academic exercise; it is
an educational and civic imperative. We believe
that shared accountability at all levels holds the
greatest promise for school and student success.
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 11 In a system of reciprocal accountability, how
do we ensure rigor and high expectations at
all levels of the educational system? What
happens when schools and districts disagree?
When parents and educators disagree?
 12 Will reciprocal accountability improve public
confidence in public schools? Will it increase
the public will to provide adequate resources
and support?
NEXT STEPS
The work on interventions is new in every city.
Administrators charged with the responsibility of
designing and implementing those interventions
have already begun to seek ways to improve their
current initiatives. Closing the gap in student
performance across schools must be part of this
improvement. The work required to close the gap
among all students (with no exceptions) makes it
essential to develop a broader policy of reciprocal
accountability among schools, parents and com-
munity members, school districts, and state
education departments.
There are, as yet, only a limited number of good
models of strong support across system levels—
ample state support for standards-based reform;
district support for curriculum redesign; school-
based professional development and support for
multiple, shared instructional strategies that give
teachers many ways to teach; school time for
reflection and data-based school improvement
planning that places student work at its center;
leadership development for parents and commu-
nity members; and a strong investment in capacity
building across the system levels.
